经理人股票期权是20世纪中叶出现的一种激励制度，它赋予公司高级管理人员一种权利，即可在预先规定的时间内以预先约定的价格购买一定数量的公司股票。它通过允许经理人参与公司剩余的分享，让剩余控制权与剩余索取权相互匹配，使得经理人的目标函数选择与公司股东利益最大化趋于一致，有效的降低了代理成本。从经理人股票期权在美国的发展历程可以看出，这一制度对于美国新经济的发展、特别是高新技术公司的成长起到了巨大的推动作用。但是美国最近几年爆发的与之相关的财务丑闻，使其会计处理方法备受非议，最终导致了经理人股票期权会计准则的一系列修改和补充。目前比较有影响力的会计准则主要是美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）的财务会计准则123号《股权薪酬会计》（SFAS123）和国际会计准则理事会（IASB）的国际财务报告准则2号《以股份为基础的支付》（IFRS2）。我国的经理人股票期权虽然起步较晚，但是近几年发展迅速。2006年2月我国借鉴了国际会计准则理事会的IFRS2颁布了《股份支付》的企业会计准则，填补了这方面会计规定的空白。但是无论是国外还是我国的准则在对股票期权会计问题的解决中较少以基础会计理论为出发点，还有许多可以改进的空间，正是基于这样的考虑，笔者将经理人股票期权的会计问题作为本文的研究目标。
本文采用规范的研究方法，以基础会计理论为指导，论述了国内外关于经理人股票期权会计处理观点的合理性和不足,并期望从以下三个方面完善我国经理人股票期权的会计处理问题。
1、以基本会计理论为基础，从经理人股票期权的经济实质出发，指出经理人股票期权会计所涉及会计对象的合理会计要素选择；
2、按照资产负债观的处理思路，从加强会计信息的相关性出发，重新设计经理人股票期权的费用化办法；
3、在上述论证的基础上，探讨经理人股票期权会计的后续和终止确认问题；
4、通过对几种计量属性的分析，阐述在我国应用公允价值对经理人股票期权进行计量的必要性和可行性，并指出现阶段符合我国实际的经理人股票期权的公允价值计价模型。
关键词：股票期权；确认；计量；公允价值
ABSTRACT
The Executive Stock Option(ESO) is a kind of incentive system appeared in the middle of the 20th century, it entitles the senior company managers to purchase amount of the company’s stock at fixed price within the period set in advance. It matches the power of surplus control and the power of surplus share by allowing the executive to enjoy the surplus share, consequently makes the target function choice of the executive incline to maximize the shareholder’s benefits, lower the cost of the Clint-Agent effectively. This incentive system played an important role in promoting the development of the United States’new economy, especially in the growth of American high-tech companies. But a series of finance scandals broke out in the United States in recent years brought lots of controversy towards its accounting methods. With a series of revision and amendments, the latest main regulations about the accounting stipulation are SFAS123 issued by FASB and IFRS2 issued by IASB. Compared with the United States, in our country the Executive Stock Option started to appear lately, but it has a rapid development in recent years. In February 2006, China issued new Enterprise Accounting Standards including the 11th regulation –Share-based Payment, which borrows ideas from IFRS2 and fill the vacancy of the accounting regulation related, But our country’s standards lack of consideration from theoretical aspects during the solution of the accounting problem of the ESO, leaving some room to improve. Based on this consideration, the research objective of this article is the accounting problem of the Executive Stock Option .
The article discusses the latest accounting treatment of the Executive Stock Option at abroad and domestic, as well as the rationality and deficiency of the new accounting standards by using the canonical research methods, directed by the basic accounting theories. Furthermore, this article expects to perfect our country’s accounting treatment about the executive stock option from the following four aspects.
1、Based on elementary accounting recognition theories, started from the economic essence of stock options, discusses the accounting attribute choice of accounting objects involved in the Executive Stock Option accounting;
2、Based on the treatment of Asset-Liability, started from the strength of the relevance of the accounting information, redesigns the expense method of the stock option transfer;
3、Based on the above documents, explores the aftermath and terminal recognition of the stock opinion;
4、By analyzing several measurement attributes of the stock option, elaborates the necessity and the feasibility of using the fair-value measurement attribute to measure the ESO, and establishes the fair-value pricing mode of the ESO which is suitable for present practice of China.
Key words: Stock option; Recognition; Measurement; Fair-value
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